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OBJECTION TO PORTIONS OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant E. D. Shelledy believes it is necessary to raise a
couple points in

clarification

of

the

Statement

of

Facts as

propounded by Salt Lake County in its brief.
First, Salt Lake County asserts that the property in dispute
"...had been sold

to

sale..."

time

at

property.

the
Such

Salt

Lake

the

language

County

SBA

at

acquired

misstates

the

a

preliminary tax

its

interest in the

preliminary

tax sale

statutes and attempts to lend unwarranted support to the County's
interpretation of the interests of the various parties
the property
proceeding.

immediately before

hereto in

and after the 1984 May tax sale

See Argument, Point I, infra.

Second, the County's allegation that at the time of the 1984
tax sale, "...taxes were due and owing for 1978, 1980, 1981, 1982
and 1983, in the total amount of $5,408.63"
legal conclusion
lawsuit, i.e.,
against the

assumes as

fact its

over one of the major points in dispute in this
whether

any

property after

taxes

could

its acquisition

lawfully

be assessed

by the SBA in 1981.

See, R. 71-77.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE SBA HAD AN INTEREST IN THE
PROPERTY OVER WHICH CONGRESS HAD
NOT WAIVED SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY.
Shelledy and Salt Lake County disagree
of the

preliminary tax

of the parties.

on the

legal effect

sale of 1978 on the subsequent interests

The County continues to allege, in
1

spite of the

language of

the preliminary

was "sold" to the County at
effectively

treats

The

asserts

County

redemption

from

the

the preliminary

County

that

its

tax sale statute, that the property

the

tax sale,

and then

as titleholder to the property.
SBA

acquired

only

predecessors-in-interest,

a

the

right of
Pearsons,

pursuant to the quit-claim deed in 1981.
Although any interest over which Congress
waived

immunity

would

Shelledy believes
interest in

survive

that the

the property

the County's tax sale attempts,

SBA acquired

case

law

support

record title ownership

from the Pearsons, subject to the lien

of the County as of the date of the 1981
and

had not expressly

deed.

Utah's statutes

Shelledy's position respecting the legal

effect of the preliminary tax sale.
Perhaps

most

preliminary tax

directly

sale on

indicative

of

the

effect

of

a

the interests of the record titleholder

at the time is Section 59-10-42 (now Section 59-2-1353):
In all cases where any county claims a lien
on real estate for delinquent general taxes
which have not been paid for a period of four
years, such county may foreclose such lien by
an action in the district court.
Id. [Emphasis added.]
The above

statute provides

the County

with an alternative

method of foreclosing its tax lien besides the final May tax sale
procedure.

One must presume that had th€>

legislature intended a

preliminary tax sale to actually sell the property to the County,
it would not have continued to refer to the County's
a lien.

Nor,

interest as

of course, would there be any need to statutorily
2

provide for the final May
foreclosure

option

to

tax

sale

similarly

procedure
foreclose

or
the

the judicial
county's lien

interest.
Utah case law also supports Shelledy on this issue.
case of
518

In the

Salt Lake Home Builders, Inc. v. Colman, 30 Utah 2d 379,

P.2d

165

(1974)

the

Court

made

clear

that

a

record

titleholder retains rights of ownership after the preliminary tax
sale:
Corroborating the
idea
that
the owner
continues to
have some interest in his
property until there is a valid May sale are
these provisions of Subsection (6) of Section
59-10-64 relating
to
that
sale: [cite
omitted] While there may be some overlapping
of the language of this statute with the idea
that the owner is required to redeem prior to
April 1st, the emphasized language, that
after the
May sale the "property shall
thereupon vest in the county" plainly imports
that there remained in the property owner
(plaintiff) some ownership interest therein.
Otherwise there would be nothing left to
"thereupon vest in the county."
Id. at 382 (P.2d, at 167).
Similarly, in Dillman v. Foster, 656
the

court

implied

by

preliminary tax sale does

its

recitation

not deprive

P.2d 974
of

the

the record

(Utah 1982),
facts

that

a

owners of any

ownership rights, including the ability to convey those rights to
others.
on and

After reciting the chain
preliminary tax

sale of

of events

from the assessment

the property while title was in

the plaintiff Dillmans, through various conveyances

of the title

after the preliminary tax sale and up until the time of the final
May tax sale, the court stated:
3

"Following the sale [preliminary tax sale],
neither
the
plaintiff
nor any of the
subsequent
titleholders
paid
the
19 64
taxes ... ."
Id. at 9 76.

[Emphasis added.]

See, also, Bozievich v. Slechter,

109 Utah 373, 376, 166 P.2d 239 (1946) (tax sale certificate does
not purport to convey title to the land).
Thus, since the SBA acquired record title ownership interest
in the property via the 1981

quit-claim deed

the

the

sovereign

immunity

property and Salt Lake
its tax
Alabama.

lien through

of

United

County was
the 1984

from the Pearsons,

States

applied to the

without authority

May tax

sale.

to enforce

United States v.

313 U.S. 274, 61 S.Ct. 1011, 85 L.Ed. 1327 (1940).

Nor

could the County assess further taxes on the property after title
was acquired by the SBA.

United States

v. City

of Roanoke, 258

F.Supp. 415 (W.D.Va. 1966).
POINT II:
THE COUNTY'S LIMITATIONS POSITION IS
UNTENABLE UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.
Salt Lake

County's position regarding its claim of a bar by

limitations statute to Shelledy's quiet-title claim simply cannot
be supported under any view of the facts of this case.
Shelledy

believes

the

under the circumstances of
out in

more detail

statutes of limitation cannot apply
the instant

in his

Appellant's Brief,

nutshell, Shelledy's position is
cannot

apply

to

create

action, as

a

that such

has been set

Point III.

In a

limitations statutes

valid tax title under circumstances
4

where the County lacks
title.

The County

authority

over

the

point

property

to convey

alleges that Shelledy has misinterpreted the

language of various cited decisions.
belabor

the

at

this

Shelledy will

time,

not further

but refers the court to his

previously stated arguments.
However, the Court may

choose

to

decline

to

address the

question of the applicability of the limitations statutes because
the County has not
even if

seriously

the limitations

addressed

statutes did

could not commence to run until
from the

Shelledy's
apply in

point that,

this case, they

Shelledy purchased

the property

SBA, less than six months prior to initiating his quiet

title action herein.
The County has made
involving the

some

since

the

references

to cases

issue of whether the government was the real party

in interest, absent which
States would

generalized

not apply,
government

the sovereign
and then

no

longer

immunity of

leaps to
claims

the United

the conclusion that
an

interest

in

the

property, the limitations defense to Shelledy's quiet title claim
is available.
The County fails to recognize that in this
limitations claim,

it must

case, as

in any

be able to show when the limitations

period started, and that the full statutory period ran its course
to

a

date

after

which

the

statutory bar would be effective.

Under the facts of this case, the County
these
States.

points

because

of

the

simply cannot establish

sovereign immunity of the United

At the time of the 1984 May tax
5

sale and

continuing to

the sale to Shelledy in December, 1989, the SBA claimed ownership
interest in the subject property.
claim a

limitations bar against Shelledy, the limitations period

would have to have run during
which

it

government.
U.S.

For the County to successfully

120,

could

not

do

S.Ct.

v. Nashville,

1006,

30

S.Ct.

1,

5

L.Ed.2d

authority to suggest any

SBA's ownership,

1

C. &

St.L.R. Co. , 118

L.Ed. 81 (1886); support, United

States v. John Hancock Mutual Life
81

of the

because of the immunity of the federal

United States
6

the time

Insurance Co.,

(1960).

way in

The

364 U.S. 301,

County has cited no

which the

statutory period may

run during the time of SBA ownership and thus bar Shelledy in his
quiet title action filed less than six months after acquiring the
property from the SBA.
During the

SBA's time

of ownership of the property, it was

obviously the real party in interest, and the County's suggestion
that there

is no direct burden on the government when the County

purports to sell the property of the sovereign
patently ridiculous.
than the deprivation of
until Congress

There

can scarcely

the government's

at a

tax sale is

be any greater burden
property interest, and

expressly consents to such a taking, it cannot be

done by any state or local government entity.
POINT III.
KEMMERER COAL
CO.
v.
BYU IS
DISTINGUISHABLE AND NOT CONTROLLING
IN THIS CASE.
One of the County's key arguments

against Shelledy

in this

action is that he lacks standing to assert the sovereign immunity
6

of the United States, under the doctrine that one may
the constitutional

rights of another.

not assert

The County cites the case

of Kemmerer Coal Company v. BYU, 723 F.2d 54 (10th Cir. 1983).
Shelledy believes
rights of

another" in

he

is

Shelledy

the sovereign

Co. v.

(D.C. Wyo. 1925).

is

immunity of

the situation in some cases cited
Northside Canal

"raising

the constitutional

the first place and that such doctrine is

inapplicable in this case.
himself in

not

by

State Board

He simply

not

seeking

to cloak

the United States, as was
the

County.

See, e.g.,

of Equalization, 8 F.2d 739

asserts

the

legal

effect

of the

County's purported 1984 tax sale in light of the ownership of the
property by his grantor, the SBA.
In any event, there
the instant

acknowledge

overemphasized.
a

critical distinction between

case and the Kemmerer Coal Co. v. BYU case which the

County fails to

over

remains a

tax

procedurally

or

In Kemmerer,

deed

which,

defective

address,

and

the situation

although

manner

which

involved a dispute

apparently

by

county

cannot be

issued

in

a

tax authorities, was

"executed by the same authority that could have passed good title
if each

and every

statutory step

in perfecting a tax title had

been followed... . •• Hansen v. Morris, 3 Utah2d 310, 293 P.2d 884
(1955).

In

ownership of

the
the

sovereign immunity
not under any
without the

instant
property
of the

circumstances
express consent

action,

because

was

the

in

SBA

the

record

which

title

enjoys the

United States, Salt Lake County could
pass

good

of Congress.
7

title

to

the property

Thus, this case falls

squarely within the parameters
Hansen

v.

Morris,

supra,

set

when

out
it

by

the

Utah

discussed the scope of the

special statutes of limitations favoring tax deeds.
broad language

Court in

Despite the

of the statutes, the Hansen Court recognized that

such statutes could not apply where

the authority

executing the

tax deed could not pass good title*
Similarly, the Utah Court of Appeals in Baxter v. Utah Dept.
of Transportation, 783 P.2d 1045 (Ut.App. 1989), cert, denied 133
U.A.R. 18

(Utah 1990), implicitly recognized the inapplicability

of the limitations statutes where the county "had no authority to
tax the

property, to acquire title when taxes were unpaid, or to

convey title through a
underlying

reasons

tax deed."

for

the

lack

Id.

at 1047.

Although the

of authority to convey title

through a tax deed are different, the end result is the same—the
counties

had

no

authority

over

the

property and the special

limitations statutes have no application to such situations.
Also with regard to the Kemmerer case, Shelledy
must be

strictly limited

to its

facts.

believes it

In Kemmerer, the Tenth

Circuit was faced squarely with a

fact situation

falling within

the

Supreme

previously had

area

over

which

the

Utah

reserved its opinion—that is,

the

Court

application

of

the special

statute of limitations where the tax title was allegedly acquired
by "...means repugnant to fundamental fairness or whether such an
application of
intent

or

the statute

constitutional

would exceed the limits of statutory
permissibility."

LaFleur, 632 P.2d 827, 831 n.14 (Utah 1981).
8

Frederiksen

v.

In

Kemmerer,

the

original

tax title to the disputed coal

interests was issued in 1941 at a time when the records indicated
ownership in San Rafael Fuel Company.
from the tax deed ultimately arrived
years after

the issuance

of the

predecessor

in

at BYU.

Well

tax title

more than twenty years after Emery
BYU's

The chain of title arising
over thirty

to Emery County and

County issued

a tax

deed to

interest, San Rafael's successor attacked

the validity of the tax title.
Rather than address the difficult issue reserved by the Utah
Supreme Court
of the

in Frederiksen, the Tenth Circuit chose to dispose

matter

asserting

by

the

reciting

constitutional

Court's decision is
that, under

the

perhaps

the peculiar

principle

right
best

of

of

a

litigant not

another.

However, the

explained

by

the indication

facts of that case, "While it may have

been 'repugnant to fundamental fairness' to deprive San Rafael of
its

property

without

fundamentally unfair
Kemmerer...

•"

proper
to

we

do

apply

the

statute

Coal

Co.

v.

Kemmerer

(emphasis added).

notice,

not
of

BYU,

believe

it

limitations to

supra,

at

57-58

It is submitted that the Tenth Circuit, unable

to find or seek guidance from the Utah Supreme Court at the time,
determined that, under the

facts before

limitations

cut

statutes

to

off

a

it, application
due

process

of the

claim

was

warranted.
It should
cited by

also be

the Kemmerer

argument to bar a

noted that

the sole

federal court case

court in support of raising this standing

grantee's

assertion
9

that

its

grantor's due

process

rights

were

Kemmerer decision.
(1st Cir.
standing

violated
In

does

not,

United States

in fact, support the

v. Haddon,

550 F.2d 677,

1977), the First Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the
of

the

proceedings denied

defendants

to

due process

to the owners at the time of the

condemnation for the specific
any privity

of title

were violated.
title of

reason that

with the

but

were owners
derived

that

condemnation

the defendants lacked

owners whose rights they claimed

The Haddon defendants

those who

proceedings,

assert

were not

in the

chain of

at the time of the condemnation

their

title

from

a

tax

deed

in

contravention to the title of those owners.
Thus, the

standing determination

in Haddon was a result of

the lack of privity, which does not support
decision.

The

doctrine

of

standing

the Kemmerer court's

deals, in essence, with

whether the litigant has a personal stake in the issue presented.
H.L. v.

Matheson, 450

U.S. 398,

lOlS.Ct. 1164,

67 L.Ed.2d 388

(1981); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S.Ct. 2197,
343 (1975).
possibility

There
of

Shelledy would

can be

losing

no greater

one's

interest

in a

tax sale

who owned the property
Daniell v.

at the

Sherrill, 48

County, 105 Wis. 2d
Brunner, 30

stake in an issue than a
in

his

property,

and

submit that the question of standing in this type

of case is not a legitimate issue.
assert defects

45 L.Ed 2d

346,

Wash. App.

Any grantee has the

right to

to the same extent as his grantor
time of

the tax

sale.

Support,

So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1950); Preston v. Iron
314

N.W.

532, 635

10

2d

131

P.2d 778

(1981);

Morcum v.

(1981); McGuiness v.

Mavnard, 658

P.2d 1104

(Mont. 1983).

interest the right to assert
effort to

clear his

claims

of

deny a successor-in-

his

predecessor

in an

title would lead to untenable results.

example, assume that a piece of
without any

To

compliance with

due process violation.

property is

sold at

For

a tax sale

notice requirements, resulting in a

If the

property owner

then died, under

the County's position, his heirs or estate would lack standing to
assert that due
because their
not

process

violation

due process

allowed

to

assert

in

attacking

the

rights
Such

of

another,

important

interests in property cannot be determined
time of

death of

an owner,

even

their

to

claim

rights

upon a

mere fortuity

and it seems obvious that a

challenge to their standing could not be upheld to bar
from disputing

the tax

sale in such

the County's standing argument
Shelledy

urges

the

tax sale

rights were not violated and they are

predecessor-in-interest.

of the

the

Court

lacks

circumstances.
merit

in

the heirs
Similarly,

this

case, and

to reject the unsupported attempt to

greatly expand currently accepted standing doctrine.
CONCLUSION
The County and the tax sale purchasers ultimately are asking
this

Court

to

permit—deprive

allow
the

them

to

sovereign

do
of

that which the law does not
an

ownership

interest

in

property without the express consent of Congress.
Appellant

E.

D.

Shelledy

respectfully requests the Court

reject the County's argument, reverse the
court and

decision of

the trial

order the trial court to enter judgment quieting title
11

to

the

ordering

property

in

defendant

Shelledy paid

Shelledy
Salt

it under

and

Lake

against all defendants, and

County

to

refund

the

amounts

protest, less the amount of the County's

tax lien as of January 14, 1981, and

any legitimate

tax accrued

since the purchase by Shelledy.
Shelledy

also

respectfully

requests

the

Court award him

costs on appeal and to direct the trial court to

award him costs

in the trial court proceedings.
DATED September

/7,

1990.

^

.

;

^

^

"ERIC P. HARTMAN
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